History of Ireland

On 12 October 1984, the IRA detonated a bomb at the Grand Hotel, Brighton, England where the UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and her cabinet were staying during the Conservative Party conference. As part of the hotel collapsed, five people were killed, several MPs seriously injured and Mrs Thatcher was lucky to escape alive. The IRA released a chilling statement saying "You were lucky this time. But remember, we only have to be lucky once." Shortly afterwards Ms Thatcher firmly rejected the NIF's report with a firm "No. No. No." to the three alternatives and, while this response satisfied Unionists, it was disappointing for the SDLP.

However, the UK realised that the problems in Northern Ireland were not going to stop until a settlement could be reached. So they began secret negotiations with the Irish government in early 1985 to try to find some common ground for working on. They succeeded in finding some of this common ground, and on 15 November 1985 the two governments made public what they had agreed upon: (a) the UK recognised the Irish Republic's right to make proposals concerning Northern Ireland (b) the Irish Republic recognised that a united Ireland was a long term objective and that it could only be achieved through majority consent. (c) the two governments were to set up a conference between them, to discuss issues of mutual interest and to help produce a better society in Northern Ireland. Called the Anglo-Irish Agreement it was signed in Belfast on 15 November 1985. The Irish government narrowly voted for it on the 21 November and the UK government approved it by a huge majority on 27 November. Although all the Ulster Unionist MPs were against the Agreement, this was ignored.

The reaction within the Unionist community was uproar, genuine shock and a feeling of betrayal. From their point of view, the idea that their own government could give a foreign country the right to a say in Northern Ireland affairs without consulting the Northern Ireland MPs was incredible. The Ulster Unionist leader, James Molyneaux, said that Northern Ireland was being delivered "from one nation to another". Although the SDLP supported the agreement, Sinn Fein was against it because the Irish government was recognising Northern Ireland's existance. Some individual UK and many individual Irish ministers spoke out against the agreement too.

As a protest, all the Unionist MPs resigned, forcing new elections all over Northern Ireland. Although the Unionist vote went up, they lost the constituency of Newry and Armagh to the SDLP. They began a campaign to have the Agreement abolished using the slogan 'Ulster Says No'. 'Ulster Says No' banners soon appeared on local government buildings all over Northern Ireland, including a huge one on Belfast City Hall. The mass demonstrations, led by Ian Paisley of the DUP and James Molyneaux of the UUP, continued all through 1985 and into 1986 but had little effect. In February 1986, the UUP and DUP began boycotting all UK government officials, but again, this did not change anything. The Northern Ireland Assembly, which was a relic of the failed Sunningdale Agreement, was abolished on 23 June, 1986. Some members, mainly from the DUP had to be physically dragged out of the building. In 1986, the UVF and UDA decided to use violence to try to force the abolition of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. They began a terrorist campaign against Catholics and specifically the RUC, who they saw as traitors since they were required to enforce the Agreement. Attacks on homes increased. In February 1987, a 400,000 signature petition was given to the Queen. By 1987, the government was still ignoring the campaign, and it began to dwindle away. Margaret Thatcher won the 1988 General Election and reviewed the Anglo-Irish Agreement. When the review resulted in no significant changes, most Unionists gave up hope of ever removing it and acknowledged that their campaign had failed.

All during this period, violence had continued with almost 300 murders, by all terrorist groups, between 1984 and 1987 inclusive. One of the worst massacres was on 6 Novemnber 1987 when the IRA detonated a bomb at the war memoral in Enniskillen, as crowds of civilians gathered to watch a Remembrance Day parade. One building collapsed onto the crowd, killing 11 people and injuring many more. One survivor was still in a coma in 1998. In March 1987, the British secret services shot dead three IRA members at Gibraltar, although there is still a lot of uncertainty about what exactly happened. A few days later, a loyalist gunman named Michael Stone killed three mourners at the funerals of the men. When two British soldiers accidently drove into the vicinity of the funeral cortege of those three mourners, they were mobbed and dragged out of their car and brutally murdered. The presence of media cameras meant that the murders were recorded and broadcast on televisions across the world.

As the violence continued, the UUP and DUP ended their boycott of the UK government in September 1987 in order to have talks about the possibility of having new peace talks. Around about this time, a media broadcasting ban was introduced for those organisations that advocated violence. This included the IRA, UVF, Sinn Fein and the UDA, and was designed to 'starve them of publicity'. Between 1988 and 1992, there were many attempts to create conditions for all-party talks in Northern Ireland. To simplify things, the talks were divided into three strands. Strand one concerned the internal government of Northern Ireland. Strand two concerned North-South relations. Strand three concerned UK-Irish relations. The UK also hinted that they might talk to Sinn Fein if the IRA halted its campaign of violence. Until then, Sinn Fein would be excluded from the talks.

When they finally began in 1991, the talks did not get far. Each party had a vital issue that it was not prepared to compromise upon, and none of the main terrorist groups (IRA [Sinn Fein was not invited], UDA and UVF) were represented. Any agreement that did come out of the talks would not include the people causing the violence. Something new and different was needed that could break the stalemate, and preferably something that could allow the terrorist groups to be represented. The problem with this was that most people have a problem with allowing people who use terrorist methods to enter democratic discussions. The challenge was taken up by John Hume, the leader of the SDLP. He began to have negotiations with Gerry Adams, the President of Sinn Fein concerning the possibility of an IRA ceasefire and how it could allow Sinn Fein to join the talks process. The result was a document, called the Hume-Adams Initiative, which was presented to both governments.

Around about this time, the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party were formed respresenting the UVF and UDA respectively. (Sometimes referred to as the "fringe loyalists".) This gave the loyalist terrorists a political voice for the first time, in the same way that the IRA could speak through Sinn Fein. Unlike the 1988-1992 talks, the way was now clear for terrorist organisations to be present at talks - providing they halted their terrorism by calling a ceasefire. This was vital, since it was the terrorists who were causing the violence in Northern Ireland. It was this set of the right conditions, as well as the Hume-Adams Initiative, that prompted the British and Irish governments to make an historic announcement late in 1993.

1993 - 1996: The First Ceasefires and the Peace Process

In late 1993, the British and Irish governments looked at the situation and realised that the conditions were now right to begin a new peace process. For the first time ever, all the terrorist groups had political representatives who were prepared to negotiate. The people of Northern Ireland had endured 24 years of violence and there was growing feeling that something had to be done to end it once and for all. So the two governments met and, on 15 December 1993, announced their mutual positions on Northern Ireland which they hoped would be the basis for future negotiations. Called the Downing Street Declaration, it committed both governments to developing new political frameworks and permitting any party that gave up violence to join talks. The UK declared that they had "no selfish, strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland", accepted that a united Ireland was possible if a majority so desired and promised to work towards an agreement. The Irish agreed that a united Ireland could only happen with majority consent and would set up a Forum for Peace and Reconciliation. This declaration angered the extreme Unionists, who accused the UK of selling off Ulster and Sinn Fein (whose only MP, Gerry Adams, lost his seat in the 1993 election) said it was 'disappointed'. The groups representing terrorists called for clarification of the document. The more moderate parties gave it a guarded welcome.

After several months, the UK government released a commentary on the Declaration clarifying the issues for the terrorist-linked parties. They said that both Sinn Fein and the fringe loyalists could join the talks if they "laid down their arms". In February 1994, the USA permitted Gerry Adams to go there for the first time, and he recieved huge publicity. Afterwards, President Clinton urged the IRA to call a ceasefire. Eventually, on 31 August 1994 and after 25 years of violence, the IRA announced a "complete cessation of military operations". Spontanious celebrations broke out all over Nationalist areas which Unionists viewed with suspicion. However, six weeks later, on 13 October 1994, the Combined Loyalist Military Command (an umbrella group which represented the UVF and UDA) announced their own cessation. Although the way now appeared clear for talks to begin, it was not to be that simple.

The Unionists objected strongly to suggestions that the parties should become involved in talks, pointing out that neither organisation had said their cessations were permanent, which they understood the Downing Street Declaration to require. While the SDLP said they believed the cessations were permanent, Sinn Fein said the term was meaningless. However, the UK government went ahead with meeting Sinn Fein on 9 December 1994, the first such meeting since 1972, and again in the first half of 1995. No talks were planned, however. As a confidence building measure, British Army daytime patrols in Belfast were abolished in January and some security installations were dismantled and troops pulled out. Over this time, American support for Sinn Fein grew with Gerry Adams being invited to the White House for St Patrick's Day. The fringe loyalist UDP also took up an invitation.

The summer months of 1995 were marred by violence. Sinn Fein had introduced a policy of opposing Orange Order and Apprentice Boy parades, which they regarded as sectarian. Some of these marches went through Nationalist areas. These marches had followed the same routes for many years, but demographic changes had turned some formerly Unioinist areas into Nationalist areas. Now some local residents decided they were not going to tolerate marches in these areas any more. Rioting broke out all over Northern Ireland, especially at Orange parades and extensive property damage was caused. The ceasefires were strained, but held.

Although the peace talks had started by mid 1995, neither Sinn Fein nor the fringe loyalists had been premitted to enter. The main reason was that the UK Prime Minister John Major had said that the terrorists must decommission their weapons before their political wings could be admitted to the talks, to prove that their cessations were permanent. Sinn Fein was furious about this, saying that decommissioning had not been on the table when the IRA had called its ceasefire. The problem caused stalemate, and in November 1995, the two governments released another document which would set up a body to look at the issue of decommisisoning. The International Body on Arms Decommissioning was chaired by US Senator Gorge Mitchell. At Christmas 1995, US President Bill Clintion made an historic visit to Northern Ireland to support the peace process, but even this visit was not enough to surmount the stalemate. In January 1996 Senator Mitchell presented the Mitchell Report which recommended that parties be permitted to join talks if their paramilitary wings decommissioned weapons during the talks.

The IRA was furious, saying that decommissioning could not begin until the process was completed, and refused to hand over any weapons. Strains within the IRA reached new levels as Sinn Fein tried to hold them together. However on 9 February 1996, at 7pm, the IRA released a statement announced that their ceasefire was over. 60 seconds later, a massive bomb exploded at Canary Wharf in London killing two civilians and causing millions of pounds worth of damage. Sinn Fein appeared to be genuinely surprised by the announcement and bomb.

In response, the British army recommenced patrols in Belfast and some security arrangements were put back in place. The IRA had changed tactics since their last campaign, however. They were aware of the level of disappointment in the Nationalist community and so decided not to lower their support further by attacking targets in Northern Ireland. Instead, they concentrated their campaign on mainland Britain with bombs in London and a massive one in Manchester, in central England. The fringe loyalist parties managed to persuade the loyalist terrorists to maintain their ceasefires throughout this period.

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